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Equal Pay, Comparable Work,
and Job Evaluation
The requirement of equal pay for equal work under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 and the Equal Pay Act of 19632
has not eliminated sex-based discrimination in compensation. Nearly
half of all women workers hold traditionally female, substantially
sex-segregated jobs.3 As a result of widespread discrimination by em-
ployers, 4 these workers receive lower wages than workers in pre-
dominantly male and integrated jobs. The courts have generally re-
fused to order higher wages for many women in sex-segregated jobs
on the ground that the work required of them is not equal3 to better
paid work performed by men.0
To achieve the congressional objective of eradicating unfair em-
ployment practices, Title VII must be expanded beyond the equal
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). The Equal Pay Act is an amendment to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
3. See Barrett, Women in the Job Market: Occupations, Earnings, and Career Oppor-
tunities, in THE SUBTLE REVOLUTION 31, 47 (R. Smith ed. 1979) (almost half of all women
workers are employed in jobs that are at least 75% female); cf. Reagan, De Facto Job
Segregation, in WOMEN IN THE U.S. LABOR FORCE 90, 94-95 (A. Cahn ed. 1979) (concentra-
tion of women workers in "'female' jobs" has been increasing since 1960); U.S. Co.INI'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF EQUALITY FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN 39, 42-44
(1978) (for majority-group men and women to have identical occupational distributions,
approximately 66% of female workers in 441 occupational categories would have to
change jobs).
4. See pp. 660-64 infra (describing discriminatory treatment leading to low wages
for women in sex-segregated occupations).
5. Jobs are equal for the purposes of the Equal Pay Act if they have substantially
the same content. See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 203 n.24 (1974)
(women's day-shift inspection work equal to men's night shift inspection work because
duties assigned exclusiely to men-cleaning, lifting, and packing-were of "little conse-
quence"); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 264 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
905 (1970) (female selector-packers' work equal to male selector-packers' work because
not all men performed additional physical labor, and because snap-up boys routinely
performed physical labor for lower wage than women's). Jobs that do not meet the legal
test of equality may nevertheless be comparable in the sense that they are equally dif-
ficult or important. See Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1977) (clerical and
physical plant jobs found to be comparable based on employer's job evaluation). See
generally R. SIBSON, COMPENSATION 37 (1974) (explaining concept of job worth).
6. See, e.g., Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229-30 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980) (nurses' jobs not equal to jobs in general administrative
classification); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356-57 (8th Cir. 1977) (clerical work
not equal to physical plant work). But see International Union of Electrical, Radio &
Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1096-97 (3d Cir.), Petition
for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3410 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1980) (No. 80-781) (system setting low
wages for all job categories filled predominantly by women violates Title VII regardless
of whether such jobs are equal to better paid male jobs).
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pay for equal work standard. This Note argues that Title VII also
requires equal pay for comparable work-work that is of equal value
or importance to the employer. 7 The Note then proposes a method
for using job evaluation procedures to identify jobs held by women
that are comparable to better paid jobs occupied by men. Because
these procedures are widely used by employers to establish relative
wages for jobs with different content, they are a promising answer
to the problem of determining when jobs are comparable."
I. Pay Discrimination in Sex-Segegated Jobs
Private and public enforcement of the federal prohibitions against
sex-based discrimination in compensation has not reduced the dis-
parity between the earnings of male and female workers in the United
States. During the past twenty-five years, women working full-time
outside the home have earned, on average, sixty percent of men's
full-time earnings. 10 Part of this disparity is attributable to the pay-
ment to women in sex-segregated jobs of wages that are lower than
the wages paid to men in different but comparable jobs." This type
of pay discrimination is not currently remediable under federal law
7. See note 5 supra (defining comparable work).
8. See pp. 674-76 infra (describing job evaluation procedure).
9. Both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act can be enforced by either governmental
agencies or private parties. Title VII authorizes the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to investigate employment practices and, when appropriate, to ini-
tiate conciliation proceedings or file suit in federal district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b),
-5(f) (1976). An individual who wishes to challenge discriminatory practices under Title
VII must file her charge with the EEOC. Id. § 2000e-5(b). The charge must be filed with
or referred to a state or local agency when (1) a state or local law proscribes the act
alleged, and (2) a state or local entity has civil or criminal enforcement powers. The
EEOC may assume jurisdiction if the state or local agency takes no action within sixty
days. Id. § 2000e-5(c), -5(d). If the EEOC determines that legal action is necessary or ap-
propriate, it may commence enforcement proceedings. If the EEOC dismisses the com-
plainant's charge or fails to commence an action within 180 days of its filing, the ag-
grieved individual may bring suit against her employer. Id. § 2000e-5(f).
The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), provides the
enforcement mechanism for the Equal Pay Act. The EEOC may initiate litigation or,
if the Commission does not file suit, an aggrieved employee may sue to enforce the Act.
Id. § 216; see Exec. Order No. 12,106, 3 C.F.R. 263 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4
(Supp. III 1979) (transferring equal pay enforcement functions from Department of Labor
to EEOC).
10. See C. LLOYD &- B. NIEMI, THE ECONOMICS OF SEX DIFFERENTIALS 152 (1979) (in
1955, female workers' median earnings equaled 63.9% of male median earnings; in 1965,
60.0%; in 1977, 58.9%); Barrett, supra note 3, at 34 (showing relative earnings by occu-
pation); cf. Keyserling, Women's Stake in Full Employment: Their Disadvantaged Role
in the Economy-Challenges to Action, in WOMEN IN THE U.S. LABOR FORCE 25, 29 (A. Cahn
ed. 1979) (measured by comparative earnings, women's relative position in labor force
deteriorating).
11. See pp. 662-64 infra (describing wage determination when jobs are sex-segregated).
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because most courts have held that Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
require that men and women receive equal wages only when they
perform substantially equal work.12
A. Discrimination in Wage Determination
The disparity between the average earnings of male and female
workers results in part from education and career choices made by
women, and so would exist to some degree even in the absence of
discrimination by employers.' 3 As a group, women in the labor force
are less well educated 14 and less likely to have acquired job-specific
training than men. Most women who have received vocational edu-
cation work in traditionally female occupations.'3 Moreover, at pres-
ent women are more likely than men to engage in nonmarket work' 6
during part of their adult lives.' 7 To the extent that their worklives
are discontinuous, women forgo employment experiences that might
enable them to command higher wages as their careers progress.' 8
12. See notes 45 9: 46 infra (citing cases).
13. The term "discrimination" is used in two senses in this Note. First, as economists
use the term, "discrimination" refers to decisions about the distribution of wages and
jobs that are influenced by factors not related to the productivity of individual workers.
Discrimination in this sense has two components. One is pay discrimination: wage differ-
entialIs that do not reflect the actual productivity of individual workers. The other is
occupational discrimination: patterns of occupational distribution that are determined
by worker characteristics not related to productivity. See J. MADDEN, THE ECONOMICs OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION 1-2 (1973) (discussing types of discrimination); R. TSUCHIGANE & N.
DOoGE, ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1974) (same).
Second, "discrimination" denotes the set of behaviors that are proscribed by law. This
Note argues that the payment of unequal wages to men and women performing com-
parable work is discrimination in the legal sense and therefore should be remediable
under Title VII.
14. See C. LLOYD & B. NIEMI, supra note 10, at 99-101 (women less likely to complete
college than men); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 12-15 (educational at-
tainments of males exceed those of females at both high school and college levels for
nearly all racial and ethnic groups studied).
15. See C. LLOYD & B. NiEMr, supra note 10, at 104-07 (women pursue less vocationally
oriented studies than men); Cahn, Summary, in WOMEN IN THE U.S. LABOR FORCE 1, 18-19
(A. Cahn ed. 1979) (women's opportunities for vocational training or apprenticeship
generally limited to traditionally female fields).
16. Nonmarket work is productive work in the household. See C. LLOYD & B. NIEMI,
supra note 10, at 22-29 (reviewing economic theory of the household).
17. A married woman's participation in the workforce is more likely to be discon-
tinuous than a single woman's or a man's. See id. at 65 (marriage is primary correlate
of different labor supply functions for men and women); cf. J. MADDEN, supra note 13,
at 9 (best predictors of woman's labor force participation are her marital status and
number and age of her children). But see C. LLOYD & B. NIEMI, supra note 10, at 70-72,
74-76 (married women may no longer be as likely to leave work force to bear and raise
children).
18. See J. KRxrs, SEX IN THE MARKETPLACE: AMERICAN WOMEN AT WORK 44-45 (1971)
(threat of discontinuity or actual lack of job experience in woman's worklife is "greatest
single barrier" to higher wages); Polachek, Discontinuous Labor Force Participation and
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These work-preparation and employment patterns may result in some
degree of difference in productivity between men and women. Such
sex-based productivity differences may, in turn, lead to pay differ-
entials that, although arguably traceable to some form of discrimination
against women, are not the direct result of discrimination by their
current employers. 19
Despite the importance of these legally neutral20 factors, discrim-
ination against women by their employers is responsible for much
of the difference between the wages paid to men and women.2 1 More-
over, although these factors help to explain the aggregate sex-based
Its Effect on Women's Market Earnings, in SEx, DIsCRIMINATION, AND THE DIvisIox or
LABOR 90, 111 (C. Lloyd ed. 1975) (women with discontinuous employment history have
lower earnings potential than workers generally). But see Corcoran, The Structure of
Female Wages, AM. ECON. REv., May 1978, at 165, 170 (work experience, job tenure, and
full or part time nature of past work influence wages more than intermittent character
of previous participation in labor force); Keyserling, supra note 10, at 29 (disparity be-
tween earnings of men and women increasing although discontinuity in women's em-
ployment patterns decreasing).
19. Sex-based productivity differences may be related to the different socialization of
males and females. See Boulding, Toward a Theory of Discrimination, in EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY AND THE AT&T CASE 9, 13 (P. Wallace ed. 1976) (discrimination in-
cludes processes that make persons unfit for some societal roles); Taub, Keeping Wonen
in their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L.
R~v. 345, 350 (1980) (socialization and family and group pressures constrain women's
training and job choices). Although such influences may be viewed as discrimination
from a societal perspective, antidiscrimination law adopts an individualist perspective,
focusing on the particular actions of identifiable discriminators rather than on the more
impersonal forces of society. See, e.g., Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN.
L. REv. 1049, 1053-54 (1978) (law adopts "perpetrator perspective," viewing discrimination
as wrongful conduct of particular actors); Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent
Directions of Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 Wis. L. Rav. 55, 89-91 (sex discrimination
law adopts individualist approach, which emphasizes individual achievement, formal
equality, and restricted purposes of law). In addition to socialization, accurate informa-
tion about current discrimination by employers may influence women's decisions. See
J. KREPs, supra note 18, at 45 (women may realistically appraise lower rates of return
from expenditures for training); Taub, supra, at 350 n.21 ("perceptual equilibrium" may
exist in which employer attitudes and employee responses are mutually reinforcing).
Finally, sex-based productivity differences may be related to discrimination in academic
or vocational education. This type of discrimination is subject to legal attack. See, e.g.,
Education Amendments of 1972, § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (Title IX) (prohibiting
sex-based discrimination in institutions of vocational and higher education); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 703(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976) (Title VII) (prohibiting sex-based
discrimination in apprenticeship and training programs); Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (finding implied private right of action under Title IX).
20. These factors are neutral with respect to determining employer liability for pay
discrimination because dissimilar treatment based on job-related qualifications is not
prohibited by Title VII. But cf. note 19 supra (discrimination in vocational and educa-
tional training may be illegal).
21. See C. LLOYD & B. NiEmr, supra note 10, at 237-38 (in empirical studies of men
and women in specific occupations, individual job-related characteristics explained only
42% to 67% of pay disparities); Oaxaca, Male-Female Wage Differentials in the Tele-
phone Industry, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND THE AT&T CASE 17, 34 (P.




earnings differential, they do not explain pay disparities between
individual men and women having similar qualifications and per-
forming similar work.
Employers may treat men and women differently with respect to
jobs and wages for various reasons. First, employers may act simply
on the basis of prejudice. This prejudice may be the product of
animus,2 2 or, if the employers hold strong beliefs about appropriate
work-roles for women, of stereotyping 2 3 Second, employers may dis-
criminate in order to realize economic benefits. Sex-based discrimina-
tion may forestall labor disputes, when, for example, prejudiced male
employees use formal24 or informal23 disruptive mechanisms to express
their desire not to work with women. When governmental policies,
such as state "protective" labor laws, require better conditions, more
amenities, or extra benefits for women workers, employers may dis-
criminate in order to reduce or recover the costs of compliance.20
Finally, profit motives may encourage employers to discriminate if they
22. See Boulding, supra note 19, at 10-12 (distrust and hatred contribute to personal
prejudice); cf. G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971) (discrimi-
nator is willing to pay in order to avoid association with some persons).
23. See Boulding, supra note 19, at 12-13 (false generalizations and role stereotypes
contribute to discrimination); Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L.
Ruv. 235, 251 (1971) (stereotypes engender mistakes about productivity of individual
workers, which encourage discrimination).
2.4. For example, unions dominated by male employees may enforce discriminatory
policies through collective bargaining. See Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259,
262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970) (union supported segregated job classifica-
tions and preferential hiring for men). Even if a union does not wish to discriminate,
its obligation to bargain on behalf of all of its members may require it to support job
and wage classifications that disadvantage women. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
567 F.2d 429, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (union that assumed
representation after establishment of discriminatory wage structure was unable to alter
position of female workers at expense of male workers).
25. For example, male workers may refuse to work with women or may make the
workplace inhospitable to women. See Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894,
926 (D.N.J. 1978) (female engineer "subjected to odious personal harassment" by male
co-workers); Barrett, suPra note 3, at 48 (male workers sexually harass female co-workers,
rearrange work environment, and refuse to cooperate with women).
26. These regulations directly and indirectly increase the cost of hiring women by
requiring special expenditures. See Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 509
F.2d 20, 23 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1063 (1976) (state law required overtime
premium for women). Employers may comply with protective laws by excluding women
from some jobs, see, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 191 (1974) (state
statute prohibiting women from working at night produced segregated day and night
shifts); Palmer v. General Mills, Inc., 513 F.2d 1040, 1041 (6th Cir. 1975) (state-imposed
hour and weight-lifting restrictions confined women to exclusively female dihision of
one department), and may assess the costs of compliance against women's wages. See J.
MADDEN, supra note 13, at 82 (laws effectively reduce women's marginal productivity and
wages). The courts generally have concluded that compliance with state labor laws does
not excuse violations of Title VII. See, e.g., Palmer v. General Mills, Inc., 513 F.2d at
1042; Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 1973).
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perceive that women's bargaining position is weaker than men's.2 7
Employers respond to these joint pressures of bias and profit in at
least two ways. First, employers may hire and assign workers of each
sex selectively. Such sex-conscious placement practices magnify the
disparate effect of a labor market in which women already suffer an
initial disadvantage as a result of educational and employment pat-
terns that may not be attributable to individual discriminators.2s
This combination of employer practices and existing employment
patterns has limited women's employment opportunities and pro-
duced horizontal and vertical job segregation. -9 Men and women gen-
erally are found in different occupations or in different jobs within
the same occupational category;30 the result of this division is to con-
centrate women workers in low prestige, dead-end jobs.31 In effect,
men and women participate in separate labor markets.3 2
Second, employers may pay female workers lower relative wages.
This practice both results from and contributes to other discrim-
inatory employment practices. 33 Because women's job choices are con-
27. See J. MADDEN, supra note 13, at 81-84 (monopoly power of male workers and
market power of employers require women to accept employment on conditions offered
by discriminators); cf. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 206 (1974) (Con-
gress enacted Equal Pay Act in recognition of weak bargaining power of many women).
28. See pp. 659-60 supra.
29. Sex-based discrimination contributes to job segregation and limits employment op-
portunities in several wa)s that, although often illegal, persist. First, jobs may be reserved
explicitly for members of one sex. See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d
429, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (stewardess positions reserved
for women while flight attendant and pursar positions reserved for men); Diaz v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)
(flight attendant positions reserved for women). Second, jobs may be implicitly sex-
labeled by employment standards that exclude more women than men. See, e.g., Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-31 (1977) (minimum height and weight standards estab-
lished for prison guard positions); United States v. City of Milwaukee, 481 F. Supp. 1162,
1164-65 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (firefighter training required for paramedic appointments). Third,
women may be restricted to certain jobs as a result of employers' assumptions about ap-
propriate employment for women. At hearings before the EEOC in April 1980, the gen-
eral counsel of the International Union of Electrical Workers and the Coalition of Labor
Union Women testified that most workers "apply simply for a 'job,' and in almost all
cases it is the employer alone who makes the decision as to which, if any, job the male
or female or the black or white applicant should get." 104 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 5, 6
(1980) (News and Background Information).
30. See note 3 supra.
31. See Laws, Psychological Dimensions of Labor Force Participation of Women, in
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND THE AT&T CASE 125, 131-32 (P. Wallace ed. 1976)
(characteristics of women's jobs include low pay, lack of career continuity, and little spe-
cialization or on-the-job training); Taub, supra note 19, at 352 (same).
32. See J. KREPs, supra note 18, at 35-36 (separate labor markets result from sex-
labeling of jobs); C. LLOYD 8: B. NIEMI, supra note 10, at 183-89 (men compete for high-
wage jobs while women are relegated to low-wage, relatively unskilled jobs).
33. In the absence of equal pay laws, pay discrimination and job segregation may be
independent of one another; for example, unequal wages may be paid to men and women
in the same job.
Comparable Work
strained by discrimination, women are crowded into few occupations, 34
are more likely than men to be unemployed or underemployed, 3
and therefore are unable to command the same wage as similarly
skilled men.36 To the extent that employers identify jobs as "women's
work," wages for those jobs may be depressed, not only because women
lack bargaining power, but also because the same work may be more
highly valued when performed by men than by women.37 At the same
time, the very existence of low-paying, female-identified jobs impedes
the integration of the workplace because men can earn higher wages
in more traditional fields.38
The most direct result of this interaction between discriminatory
employment practices is that, when job classifications are segregated,
employers are able to determine wages separately for men and women.3 9
Such wage-setting procedures enable employers to realize the benefits
of discrimination without instituting an obviously inequitable wage
structure or violating current interpretations of the law. It is clearly
illegal for men and women to receive unequal wages for performing
34. "Occupational crowding" denotes an oversupply of workers available to meet em-
ployers' demand. See C. LLOYD & B. NsIENI, supra note 10, at 213 (employer discrimination
crowds women within occupations at bottom of promotion ladder); Barrett, supra note
3, at 50-54 (number of female job-seekers exceeds number of opportunities in traditional
female sector).
35. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, EMPLOYMENT
AND TRAINING REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 265 (1979) (in 1978, unemployment rate for women
over 16 was 7.2%; for men, 5.2%); Keyserling, supra note 10, at 30 (women's unemployment
rate was, on axerage, 25% higher than men's rate between 1947 and 1975); cf. U.S. Co'IM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 28-30 (disparities between unemployment rates of white
males and white and minority females very large and probably understated by traditional
measures).
36. See Bergmann & King, Diagnosing Discrimination, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR-
TUNITY AND THE AT&T CASE 49, 49 (P. Wallace ed. 1976) (women's wages less than wages
of equally qualified white males because of artificially curtailed demand for female labor);
Reagan, supra note 3, at 90 (consequences of job segregation include undervaluing of
work performed by women); cf. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 22-25 (at
e~ery level of education, average male earnings exceed average female earnings).
37. See Laws, suPra note 31, at 129-30 (same job within Bell Telephone S)stem paid
higher wage in companies in which job was considered male than in companies in
which job was considered female).
38. To achieve full integration of the workplace, both men and women must move
into jobs traditionally reserved for or identified with the other sex. This fact is over-
looked by some opponents of comparable work actions. See Nelson, Opton, & Wilson,
Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. M[ICH.
J.L. REF. 231, 295-96 (1980) (adoption of comparable worth theory would "imperil" job
integration by reducing incentives for women to enter traditionally male fields).
39. See, e.g., International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1096-97 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W.
3410 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1980) (No. 80-781) (employer allegedly set lower wages for all job
classifications filled predominantly by women); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 354
(8th Cir. 1977) (exclusively female clerical jobs and predominantly male physical plant
jobs of equal value paid unequal wages).
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the same work.40 Deliberately sex-conscious hiring and placement prac-
tices are also illegal under most circumstances. 4 1 But because the use
of sex as a factor to determine compensation is not now unlawful when
men and women are in different jobs, employers are able to pay un-
equal wages for comparable work.
B. The Failure of Title VII and Equal Pay Act Enforcement
to Reduce Sex-Based Pay Disparities
Two federal statutes prohibit sex-based discrimination in compen-
sation.4 2 Title VII forbids an employer "to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation . . . because of such in-
dividual's . . . sex" or "to segregate or classify his employees in any
way which would . . . adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
cause of such individual's . . . sex."43 The Equal Pay Act requires
employers to pay equal wages to men and women "for equal work on
jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and respon-
sibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions."44
40. See p. 665 infra (current interpretations of Equal Pay Act and Title VII pro-
scribe unequal wages when men and women perform "substantially equal" work).
41. Title VII provides that an employer may not "fail or refuse to hire .. . any indi-
vidual ... because of such individual's . . . sex" or "limit, segregate, or classify his em-
ployees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities . . . because of such individual's . . . sex."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). Title VII does not proscribe sex-conscious hiring when sex
is a "bona fide occupational qualification." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976); cf. Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (bona fide occupational qualification exception is
"extremely narrow"). In addition, sex-conscious employment policies may be legal when
adopted pursuant to a voluntary program of affirmative action. Cf. United Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979) (Title VII permits employers to institute programs
"designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job
categories").
42. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) (Title VII). Pay discrimination on the basis of sex by fed-
eral contractors is also proscribed by Executive Order. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R.
339 (1964-1965 Compilation), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 320 (1967),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) ("contractor will not discriminate against any em-
ployee or applicant for employment because of ... sex"). The Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs interprets the Executive Order to prohibit not only unequal pay
for equal work, but other forms of sex-based pay discrimination as well. Accordingly, the
agency has indicated that "compensation practices with respect to any jobs where males
or females are concentrated will be scrutinized closely to assure that sex has played no
role in the setting of levels of pay." 45 Fed. Reg. 86,250 (1980) (to be codified at 41
C.F.R. § 60-20.5(a)); see id. at 86,225 (regulation codifies existing policies and practices);
46 Fed. Reg. 9,084 (1981) (effective date of regulation deferred to April 29, 1981).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). The proscription against the discriminatory classifi-
cation of employees bans pay schedules that discriminate on the basis of sex. See Inter-
national Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631
F.2d 1094, 1097 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3410 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1980)
(No. 80-781).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
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Most courts have construed these statutes narrowly. The Equal Pay
Act has been held to prohibit unequal pay only when men and women
perform "substantially equal"4 or "substantially identical" work.46
Although men's and women's jobs need not be identical in every re-
spect, the focus of the court's inquiry under the Act is job content.4 7
Plaintiffs must show that any extra tasks assigned exclusively to men
are not sufficiently important to justify the sex-linked difference in
wages.48
Some suits challenging sex-based pay discrimination in jobs that
are merely comparable, not equal, to men's jobs have been brought
under Title VII. A number of courts have dismissed or rejected
comparable work claims on the ground that Title VII does not pro-
hibit any compensation practice that is not already prohibited by
the Equal Pay Act.4 9 Under this interpretation, a plaintiff relying
on Title VII also must prove that the defendant employer pays un-
equal wages for equal work.
The current judicial interpretation of Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act leaves many women with no remedy for discriminatory com-
pensation, because it precludes consideration of discriminatory pay
practices that disadvantage workers in jobs filled exclusively or pri-
marily by women. The work performed by women in segregated jobs
frequently is not equal to the work performed by male employees; 0°
45. See, e.g., Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 352 (1980) (No. 80-429); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
46. See, e.g., Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1973); cf.
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 203 n.24 (1974) ("[I]t is now well settled
that jobs need not be identical in every respect before the Equal Pay Act is appli-
cable ....")
47. See Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 352 (1980) (No. 80-429) (actual job performance and content deter-
minative); Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1171 (3d Cir. 1977) (job
content controlling for purpose of equating jobs).
48. See, e.g., Marshall v. Building Maintenance Corp., 587 F.2d 567, 569 (2d Cir. 1978)
(additional tasks justify pay differential only when they consume significant amount of
all male employees' time); Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282, 286
(4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975)'(citing cases in which extra tasks found
to be "makeweights").
49. See, e.g., Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229-30 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980) (Title VII comparable work claim barred because
Equal Pay Act requires equal work); Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593,
596 (8th Cir. 1978) (Equal Pay Act standards apply in Title VII equal work case). But
see, e.g., International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1097 (3d Cir.), Petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3410 (U.S.
Nov. 14, 1980) (No. 80-781) (Title VII broader than Equal Pay Act); Gunther v. County
of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 352 (1980) (No.
80-429) (same).
50. See note 6 supra (citing cases).
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the work performed by these women, however, may require the same
objective qualifications, skill, effort, and responsibility as better paid
jobs held by men.51 Moreover, because employers may have strong
incentives to discriminate against women in setting wages,52 and be-
cause unequal pay for equal work is unlawful, women in segregated
occupations are the most likely victims of inequitable wage payments.
Yet the prohibition of intentional job segregation alone is insufficient
to remedy this form of pay discrimination. Sex segregation is en-
trenched in the workplace, and the concentration of women in tra-
ditionally female occupations has increased since the enactment of
Title VII.53 Occupational integration is a long-term goal, providing
no relief to present victims of discrimination.54 The current need is
for an effective cause of action grounded in equal pay for comparable
work.
II. Eliminating Sex-Based Discrimination Using Title VII
Although the courts' refusal to require equal pay for comparable
work under the Equal Pay Act is probably justified,5  the same nar-
51. Based on job evaluations, see pp. 674-76 infra, jobs filled by women frequently
are found to be comparable to better paid jobs held by men. See, e.g., Christensen v.
Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1977) (clerical and physical plant jobs placed in same
labor grade after employer's job evaluation); D. TREIMAN, JoB EVALUATION: AN ANALYTIC
REvIEW 27-28 (1979) (Washington State job study found wages for women's jobs averaged
80% of wages for men's jobs with same evaluation scores).
52. See p. 661 supra (identifying prejudice and economics as motives for sex-based
discrimination).
53. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 50-51 (percentage of all women workers employed in
clerical and service jobs increased from 1965 to 1977); Reagan, supra note 3, at 95 (per-
centage of women employed in 10 predominantly female occupations increased between
1960 and 1975).
54. Cf. Reubens & Reubens, Women Workers, Nontraditional Occupations and Full
Employment, in WOMEN IN THE U.S. LABOR FORCE 103, 121-22 (A. Cahn ed. 1979) (deseg-
regating workplace will not ensure that sex-based earnings differentials will be eliminated).
55. This judicial construction is consistent with the language of the Act, which pro.
scribes unequal wages for "equal work." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). Moreover, the legislatixe
history of the Act reveals that Congress explicitly rejected a comparable work formula
in favor of the equal work standard. In 1962 the word "equal" was substituted for the
word "comparable" in H.R. 11677, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), by a floor amendment.
108 CONG. REC. 14771 (1962). Both the Senate and House bills reported out of committee
the following year mandated equal pay for "equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility and which are performed under
similar working conditions." S. 1409, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. REC. 8866 (1963);
H.R. 6060, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. REC. 9210 (1963). During the House debate,
Representative Goodell explained that use of the word "equal" rather than "comparable"
meant that "the jobs involved should be virtually identical, that is, they would be %ery
much alike or closely related to each other." 109 CoNc. REC. 9197 (1963); see SENATE
COMMs. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WVELFARE, EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963, S. REP. No. 176, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963) ("[N]o employee can be paid a wage rate less than that given
to another doing the same work, because of his or her sex").
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row interpretation of Title VII is not consistent with the broad reme-
dial purpose of the latter statute. Title VII can and should be used
to attack pay discrimination when men and women who perform com-
parable work do not receive equal wages.
A. The Scope of Title VII
The courts have offered two justifications for finding that Title
VII requires equal pay only when men and women perform equal
work. First, the Bennett Amendment 0 to Title VII has been construed
to mean that, in sex-based discrimination cases, Title VII does not
bar any wage practice not already prohibited by the Equal Pay Act.57
Second, some courts have suggested that Title VII's general prohibi-
tion of discriminatory compensation practices does not reach the pay-
ment of unequal wages for comparable work.58 These conclusions,
however, are inconsistent with the objectives of Title VII.
1. The Bennett Amendment
The Bennett Amendment to Title VII provides that "differentia-
tion upon the basis of sex" in determining compensation is not un-
lawful "if such differentiation is authorized by [the Equal Pay Act]."5 9
The courts have offered two interpretations of the Amendment ac-
cording to their understanding of the term "authorized." Two Circuit
Courts of Appeals have held that the Equal Pay Act "authorizes"
unequal wage payments only in the sense that the Act creates several
specific defenses to equal pay claims. 0° These defenses include proof
that wages are based on seniority and merit systems, systems that mea-
sure earnings "by quantity or quality of production," and "any other
differential based on any other factor other than sex."'61 According
to this view, the Bennett Amendment does not restrict the scope of
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
57. See, e.g., Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229-30 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980); International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 16, 22 (N.D. W. Va. 1977).
58. See, e.g., Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 230 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980) (no denial of equal opportunity when pay and job classifi-
cation system provided for equal pay for equal work); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353,
356 (8th Cir. 1977) (equal opportunity "not at issue" when employees receive disparate
wages for different jobs that may be equally valuable).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
60. See International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1106-07 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3410
(U.S. Nov. 14, 1980) (No. 80-781); Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 891
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 352 (1980) (No. 80-429).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976); see note 118 infra (explaining Equal Pay Act defenses).
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equal pay suits under Title VII, but merely guarantees that a de-
fendant in such a suit may raise the same defenses that would be
available if the action had been brought under the Equal Pay Act.
Other courts have interpreted the pay differentiation "authorized
by" the Equal Pay Act to refer to all inequalities in pay not expressly
prohibited by that Act.62 Relying on this construction, many courts
have held that, as a result of the Bennett Amendment, Title VII
does not prohibit unequal pay for comparable work because such dis-
parities are not prohibited by the Equal Pay Act.
6 3
The former interpretation better conforms to the goals of Title
VII.64 The Bennett Amendment's legislative history, although am-
biguous, more clearly supports the view that the Amendment's pur-
pose was to permit the Equal Pay Act defenses to be raised in equal
pay actions under Title VII.6 5 In addition, in the absence of an ex-
Under the Equal Pay Act, the burden is on the employer to show that a wage disparity
is within the enumerated exceptions. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188,
196-97 (1974).
62. See, e.g., Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229-30 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980); Molthan v. Temple Univ., 442 F. Supp. 448, 454 (E.D.
Pa. 1977).
63. See note 57 suPra (citing cases).
64. Title VII clearly prohibits all types of pay discrimination based on race, color,
national origin, or religion, including, but not limited to, unequal pay for equal work.
See, e.g., International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1096-97 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3410
(U.S. Nov. 14, 1980) (No. 80-781) (classification of jobs in which different wages paid
because of race, religion, or national origin would violate statute); Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 509-10 (E.D. Va. 1968) (unequal pay for comparable work
because of race violates statute). If the Bennett Amendment were interpreted to mean
that the statute prohibits only compensation practices prohibited by the Equal Pay Act,
a sharp distinction between sex and other group characteristics would have to be read
into Title VII. Courts have resisted this result. See, e.g., International Union of Electrical,
Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d at 1100 (expressing reluc-
tance to "conclude that Title VII would allow discriminatory behavior on the basis of
sex, when the same behavior would be prohibited if made on the basis of race, religion
or national origin'); Patterson v. Western Dev. Labs, 13 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. 772, 776
(N.D. Cal. 1976) (illogical to employ one standard to decide claims of sex-based pay
discrimination and another standard for pay discrimination based on race).
65. The Amendment was introduced in the Senate as a floor amendment to Title VII.
Comments made by two Senators during the debate support the interpretation proposed
in this Note. The Amendment's sponsor, Senator Bennett, stated that its purpose was to
ensure that "in the event of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be
nullified." 110 CONG. REc. 13,647 (1964). His statement apparently means that the Amend-
ment was intended to prevent the application of inconsistent decisional standards in
Title VII equal work cases and Equal Pay Act cases. This interpretation of Senator
Bennett's comment is supported by Senator Dirksen's remark that the Amendment only
recognized the exceptions "carried in the [Fair Labor Standards Act]." 110 CONG. REC.
13,647 (1964).
A third legislator, however, disagreed with this construction. Representative Celler
stated: "The Senate amendment . . . [p]rovides that compliance with the Fair Labor
Standards Act as amended satisfies the requirements of the title barring discrimination
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plicit statement of congressional intent, the courts generally have con-
strued Title VII's provisions in ways that benefit the members of pro-
tected groups and that narrow the exceptions to the Act's prohibition
of discrimination."" Finally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission's Guidelines adopt this less restrictive interpretation. 67 Ac-
because of sex." 110 CONG. REc. 15,896 (1964). This explanation implies that Title VII
only prohibits unequal pay for equal work.
These remarks in the Senate and the House constitute the whole of the discussion of
the Amendment's effect at the time of its adoption. Given the comments of Senators
Bennett and Dirksen, and considering that Senator Bennett was the bill's sponsor, the
legislative history on balance provides more support for the reading of the Amendment
advocated in this Note than for a more expansive reading.
66. Thus, although Title VII prohibits discrimination against whites as well as blacks
"because of" race, the Supreme Court has decided that it does not forbid employers to
institute voluntary race-conscious affirmative action programs that disadvantage some
white workers. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979). Despite statutory
language precluding challenges to disparate treatment based on a "bona fide seniority
or merit system" or on the results of a "professionally developed ability test," 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h) (1976), the Court has ordered retroactive seniority for victims of employer
discrimination, see Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 761-62 (1976), and in-
validated ability tests that exclude more blacks than whites, see Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 436 (1975). In addition, the Court has construed narrowly the
statutory exceptions to Title VII's prohibitions. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
334 (1977) (bona fide occupational qualification is "extremely narrow exception" to gen-
eral proscription of sex-based discrimination).
67. EEOC Guidelines issued in 1972 provide that "by virtue of [the Bennett Amend-
ment], a defense based on the Equal Pay Act may be raised in a proceeding under Title
VII." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8(b) (1979). This Guideline is entitled to judicial deference be-
cause the Commission has adhered to one interpretation of the Bennett Amendment.
Comnpare Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 n.19 (1977) (EEOC construction of
statute entitled to weight when agency has adhered to consistent position) with General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-44 (1976) (EEOC Guideline that "flatly contradicts"
earlier position entitled to little consideration), An earlier version of the current Guide-
line, adopted in 1965, provided:
Title VII requires that its provisions be harmonized with the Equal Pay Act . . .
in order to avoid conflicting interpretations or requirements with respect to situa-
tions to which both statutes are applicable. Accordingly, the Commission interprets
[the Bennett Amendment] to mean that the standards of "equal pay for equal work"
set forth in the Equal Pay Act for determining what is unlawful discrimination in
compensation are applicable to Title VII.
30 Fed. Reg. 14,928 (1965). Most of the courts that have examined the 1965 Guideline
have interpreted it to mean that Equal Pay Act liability standards apply in equal pay
for equal work cases brought under Title VII. This reading does not impair the avail-
ability of an action for equal pay for comparable work under Title VII. See, e.g., Inter-
national Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631
F.2d 1094, 1105-06 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3410 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1980)
(No. 80-781) (noting that under 1965 Guideline, EEOC made administrative determina-
tions of pay discrimination when men and women did not perform equal work); Gunther
v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 352
(1980) (No. 80-429) (1965 Guideline not inconsistent with conclusion that Bennett Amend-
ment only makes Equal Pay Act defenses available in Title VII actions). But see Inter-
national Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 17
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 16, 22 (N.D. W. Va. 1977) (1965 and 1972 Guidelines entitled to
no consideration because inconsistent).
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cordingly, the Bennett Amendment should be read narrowly in order
to permit equal pay for comparable work claims under Title VII.
2. Title VII Policy
Assuming that the Bennett Amendment should be narrowly con-
strued, Title VII's broad proscription of discriminatory compensation
practices plainly encompasses other types of pay discrimination in ad-
dition to unequal pay for equal work. When Congress enacted Title
VII to guarantee equal opportunities to members of protected groups, 8
it recognized that disparities in earnings between blacks and whites
were an important aspect of employment discrimination in need of
redress.69 Accordingly, the Act was designed to reach "a wide range
of incidents" and "all aspects of discrimination in employment."7
When Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to enlarge the enforcement
powers of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, it found
that sex-based disparities in earnings represented "a profound economic
discrimination against women workers," and indicated that the lower
compensation of women because of their sex was "particularly ob-
jectionable" because such practices had been prohibited since 1964.71
The courts also have emphasized the expansive character of Title
VII's prohibitions. The Supreme Court has stated that the Act pro-
hibits "all practices in whatever form" that present obstacles to fair
treatment of individual employees.72 This proscription includes prac-
tices that are fair in form but discriminatory in effect,73 as well as
68. Sex discrimination was included among the practices proscribed by Title VII by a
floor amendment passed one day prior to House passage of the Civil Rights Act. See 110
CONG. REc. 2577, 2584 (1964). As a result, there is little evidence of Congress' intent with
respect to the scope of the prohibition. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
143 (1976) (legislative history "notable primarily for its brevity"). However, when Con-
gress amended Title VII in 1972, see Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-17 (1976)), it explicitly
recognized that "[d]iscrimination against women is no less serious than other forms of
prohibited employment practices." H. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in
[1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. & NEws 2137, 2141.
69. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d. Sess. 9 (1964) ("key facts" include lower expected
lifetime earnings of blacks than whites and concentration of blacks in unskilled and
semi-skilled jobs at low wages).
70. Id. at 10.
71. H.R. RE'. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2137, 2140.
72. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976); see Taub, supra note 19,
at 403-05 (evolving Title VII standard currently focuses on neutral merit-based evaluation
of individuals).
73. Practices that have a disparate impact on members of a protected class can sur-
vive a Title VII challenge only if they are shown to be justified by "business necessity,"
that is, that they are closely related to measuring job capability or performance, or are
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intentional acts of discrimination.7 4 In light of its broad remedial
objectives, the statute has been held to protect workers against race-
based pay discrimination that does not involve a denial of equal pay
for equal work.75 If the Bennett Amendment is interpreted narrowly,
Title VII's prohibition of sex-based discrimination in compensation is
equally comprehensive. 76
Several courts have asserted, however, that Title VII does not pro-
hibit unequal pay for comparable work because it does not authorize
any interference with the labor market or with "the laws of supply
and demand." 77 This argument, that the Act's proscriptions do not
reach employment decisions or practices that are based on market
factors or economic considerations, reflects a misconception about
Title VII.
First, Title VII's primary objective is the achievement of equitable,
not efficient, employment practices. Interference with the market-
intervention in decisionmaking and invalidation of discriminatory
essential to the safety and efficiency of business operations. See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co.
v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 & n.5 (1977) (denial of accumulated seniority to employees
returning from maternity leave not justified by business necessity); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 328-32 (1977) (minimum height and weight standards that disqualified
more women than men not related to job requirement of strength); Blake v. City of Los
Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1865 (1980) (sex-
segregated job classifications maintained by police department not justified by adminis-
trative comenience or financial considerations). Some courts have stated that the em-
ployer also must prove that no less harmful alternative practice is available. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971) (business necessity means no acceptable alternative practice "would better accom-
plish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differ-
ential [sex-based] impact"); cf. Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d at 1376-77 (business
necessity doctrine is "very narrow').
74. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-37
(1977) (blacks and Hispanics "regularly and purposefully" treated less favorably than
whites); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 950 (10th Cir. 1980) (employer
consistently denied plaintiff salary commensurate with responsibilities).
75. See note 64 supra.
76. The courts have held that Congress intended to proscribe all sex-based discrimina-
tion. See City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13
(1978) ("Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.") Courts have applied the exacting stan-
dards developed in race cases, see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32
(1971) (invalidating diploma and test requirements that disproportionately excluded black
job applicants), to cases of alleged sex-based discrimination. See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co.
v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141-43 (1977) (using Griggs standard to invalidate maternity leave
policy that adversely affected women); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977)
(using Griggs standard to invalidate height and weight requirements that disproportion-
ately excluded women).
77. Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977) (Congress did not intend "to
abrogate the laws of supply and demand or other economic principles that determine
wage rates for various kinds of work"); accord, Lemons v. City 9- County of Denver, 620
F.2d 228, 229 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980).
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choices made by individual employers-is exactly what the Act re-
quires. It establishes a general rule that the race, color, national origin,
sex, and religion of employees and job applicants may not be con-
sidered in employment decisions."8 This proscription cannot be avoid-
ed merely because doing so may appear to be efficient under some
circumstances. 9 For example, Title VII does not permit an employer
to pay men and women unequal wages for equal work even if the
prevailing wage rate for qualified female workers is lower than for
qualified males.8 0 Similarly, employment decisions may not be predi-
cated on accurate generalizations about groups described by race or
sex, even though the use of such proxies may reduce the employer's
costs.8 1
Second, even if Title VII does concern efficiency,8 2 it embodies an
assumption that inequitable employment practices impair the opera-
tion of the labor market, in that such practices are ultimately inef-
ficient.8 3 In this view, a market that favors or promotes discriminatory
decisions based on group characteristics like race and sex is defective
because these traits are not related to the capabilities of individual
workers. Interference with the market is therefore warranted, and con-
78. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(a) (1976).
79. Discrimination may be efficient from the employer's point of view if sex or race
is a good predictor of productivity or if the employer incurs extra costs by hiring
women. See C. LLOYD & B. NIEN, supra note 10, at 187 (search costs for information
about productivity encourage "statistical discrimination" based on use of readily observed
traits such as sex as proxies); p. 661 supra (discussing effects of employee prejudice
and state labor laws). The assertion that higher costs are associated with employing wom-
en, however, is not a good defense to a charge of discrimination under either the Equal
Pay Act or Title VII. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 717 (1978) (although average cost to employer of providing pension benefits
to women was higher than average cost of providing benefits to men, employer may not
require women employees to make larger contributions to pension fund); EEOC v. Colby
College, 589 F.2d 1139, 1144-45 (1st Cir. 1978) (employer may not provide lower annuity
benefits to female employees than to male employees despite higher cost).
Discrimination is also efficient from the employer's perspective if the employer faces
customers who are discriminators. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d
385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (customers' preference for female flight
attendants did not justify discrimination).
80. The willingness of women to work for a lower wage than men is not "any other
factor other than sex," 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), which would justify unequal wages
under the Equal Pay Act. See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205
(1974); Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1974).
81. See City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708
(1978) ("Even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for dis-
qualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply.")
82. Cf. Fiss, supra note 23, at 313 (antidiscrimination legislation reflects not only in-
tention to benefit disadvantaged groups, but also commitment to "economic efficiency
and individual fairness").
83. See S. RaP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964) (underutilization of black labor
force estimated to have economic cost in billions of dollars).
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sistent with the promotion of economic interests, 4 when discrimina-
tion occurs.
B. Limitations on an Expanded Title VII Standard
The comparable work standard proposed in this Note would not
provide a remedy to all victims of pay discrimination. For example,
if no predominantly male job in the plaintiff's place of employment
is comparable to her job, or if an employer's workforce is entirely
female, the plaintiff would be unable to prove that she is paid less
than men performing comparable work.8s This limitation is imposed
by Title VII, which requires equitable treatment of employees with-
in, but not between, firms.80
Nor does Title VII mandate equal wages if different wages can be
explained by nondiscriminatory, business-related factors.8 7 To avoid
liability under a comparable work standard, the defendant should be
permitted to show that unequal wages are explained by factors not
related to sex. This showing might be subsumed in a business neces-
sity defense to an action based on a disparate impact theory.8 8 Al-
ternatively, because of the Bennett Amendment this showing might
be based on the Equal Pay Act defenses.3s
The most problematic aspect of requiring equal pay for comparable
work is the identification of comparable jobs.90 This task requires an
84. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (Title VII reflects
societal interest in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and ra-
cially neutral employment and personnel decisions"); Developments in the Law-Employ-
ment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1109, 1118 (1971) (Title VII may be viewed as attempt to accelerate perfection of the
market).
85. Women workers in such jobs might nevertheless obtain relief if they can dem-
onstrate that their employer would pay a higher wage to men doing comparable work.
Cf. Roesel v. Joliet Wrought Washer Co., 596 F.2d 183, 186 (7th Cir. 1979) (sex-based
discrimination found when court could infer that male employee performing equal work
to female plaintiff would have received higher salary).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) (statute prohibits an "employer" from discrim-
inating against individual employees); Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword:
In Delense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1976) (law forbids
"race-dependent" decisions by individual employers).
87. See note 119 infra (discussing business necessity defense).
88. See id.
89. See note 118 infra (discussing Bennett Amendment defenses to comparable work
actions).
90. Professor Blumrosen asserts that an employer's liability for pay discrimination could
be established without the identification of comparable jobs. She argues that a prima
facie case in comparable work actions should require no more than proof that:
jobs baie been segregated in the past or present, that jobs are identified as female or
minority jobs, that a wage rate structure exists for the segregated jobs which is low
in the employer's overall structure, or that a job is traditionally reserved for mi-
norities or women throughout the labor force.
Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
673
The Yale Law Journal
assessment of job content. In particular, the nature and the difficulty
of job duties must be analyzed because these factors determine rela-
tive wages.91 At the same time, the courts must compare jobs accord-
ing to a procedure that is independent of the market price for labor
in jobs filled by women. Job evaluation techniques offer one method
for comparing jobs that are dissimilar in content but that may nev-
ertheless be comparable. 9 2
III. Job Evaluation and the Comparable Work
Standard for Achieving Equitable Pay
Employers routinely use job evaluation systems to translate infor-
mation about the content of different jobs into appropriate wage rates.
In comparable work actions, courts could use these systems to scru-
tinize challenged rates of pay by taking account of factors that legit-
imately influence compensation. The Title VII prima facie case could
readily be adapted to include proof of comparable work through the
use of job evaluation procedures. The potentially discriminatory fea-
tures of such procedures should not preclude their use as a tool for
attacking discriminatory wage structures.
A. Job Evaluation
Job evaluations are one method that employers use to establish pay
schedules. Job evaluation systems are designed to order a set of jobs
or positions so that dissimilar work can be compared to determine
appropriate relative wage levels. 93 Their methodology assumes that
of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397, 468 (1979). This formulation starts from the premise
that, absent proof to the contrary, the market rate for segregated jobs reflects discrimina-
tion. Id. at 488. Even if this premise is correct, Blumrosen's test is flawed because it does
not require the plaintiff to show that her job is comparable to some better paid male
job or that her wages are in fact discriminatory. Her test adopts a societal perspective
and does not conform to the Title VII prima facie case established by decisional law.
See pp. 677-78 infra (plaintiff has burden of proving facts sufficient to raise inference
of discrimination).
91. See A. REEs, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK AND PAY 166-69 (1973).
92. Alternatively, comparable jobs could be identified through marginal productivity
analysis. See Nelson, Opton, & Wilson, supra note 38, at 257 ("[M]arginal productivity
analysis measures the worth of work by the value that . .. fit] adds to the total output
of the enterprise.") Employers rarely determine actual wages by marginal products, how-
cver, because their measurement is difficult. Id. at 257 & n.l13. Job evaluation procedures
therefore represent a more practical method for identifying comparable work justifying
equal pay.
93. See D. BELCHER, COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION 88 (1974); D. TREIMAN, supra note
51, at I (interim report to EEOC on job evaluation methodology by National Research
Council of National Academy of Sciences). Job evaluation systems are used to achieve
equitable wage relationships between jobs within a single organization. Mossholder, Nurick,
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remuneration should be based on the content of the job rather than
on the characteristics of its holder,94 and that the compensable ele-
ments of job content can be identified and measured.9 5 Most public
and private entities with more than a small number of employees rely
on job evaluations or on a related procedure to construct systems of
compensation.96
Job evaluations are completed by developing occupational descrip-
tions according to which each job being studied may be ranked or
scored. That hierarchy is then converted into a compensation schedule.
In firms with few employees, the use of subjective ranking or classi-
fication systems may be feasible.97 The majority of plans, however,
depend on the identification of generalizable, compensable factors,9 1
the assignment of point values or weights to each factor for each job,99
Gordon, & Pryor, An EPA Exceptions Model-Cracking the Sex-Based TVage Differential,
COMPENSATION REV., First Quarter 1979, at 42; Thomsen, Eliminating Pay Discrimination
Caused by job Evaluation, PERSONNEL, Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 11-12.
A job-content based method for setting wages and salaries serves various objectives.
First, the pay structure will be comprehensible and appear rational to employees. Second,
an ordered wage structure facilitates setting rates for new or altered jobs and provides a
basis for discretionary rewards based on seniority, merit, or individual production. Third,
use of a system may strengthen the position of the employer relative to employee organi-
zations, reducing grievances and facilitating wage negotiations. See D. BELCHER, supra,
at 91-92; H. STANVAY, APPLIED JoB EVALUATION 8 (1947); cf. EEOC v. Kenosha Unified
School Dist. No. 1, 620 F.2d 1220, 1225 (7th Cir. 1980) (union requested job evaluations
that supported pay differential).
94. See D. BELCHER, supra note 93, at 88; D. TRE IAN, supra note 51, at I.
95. The compensable elements of a job include discrete tasks or duties and less tangible
factors such as effort. See R. SlasoN, supra note 5, at 29-30 (job analysis requires informa-
tion about difficulty of jobs, amount of time they require, nature of job objectives, weight
of demands on jobholders, and quality of work environment); D. TREIMAN, supra note 51,
at I (same). In some cases, the compensable factors chosen will be few in number, see id.
at 3 (four to sexen factors), but in others, jobs will be measured by many discrete charac-
teristics. See D. BELCHER, supra note 93, at 140-41 (over 50 factors). The identification
and measurement of appropriate factors is most successful when the jobs being studied
are similar. Therefore, job evaluation plans for job clusters-jobs linked by production
function, skill, or some other characteristic, see Livernash, The Internal Wage Structure,
in CONPENSATION AND REWARD PERSIEcrivEs 157, 160-61 (T. Mahoney ed. 1979)-are used
more often than plans for whole organizations. D. TREI.MAN, supra note 51, at 5.
96. See D. TREIMAN, supra note 51, at 49 n.l (federal government, most state and large
county governments, and, according to available evidence, majority of large private firms
use formal job evaluation procedures).
97. Ranking systems entail an evaluation of "whole jobs," rather than job components,
to develop a hierarchy of job values. See D. BELCHER, supra note 93, at 146-49; D.
TREvAN, supra note 51, at 2. Classification systems, by contrast, involve the development
of an ideal hierarchy of jobs according to overall difficulty or value. Existing and new
jobs are then assigned values by comparing their characteristics with this classification
system. See D. BELCHER, supra note 93, at 149-50; D. TREIMAN, supra note 51, at 2-3.
98. See note 95 supra.
99. For example, a skill factor could be measured on a five-step scale in which the
first step requires "average learning ability and good aptitude for factory operations";
the third, "some specific knowledge such as blueprint reading"; and the fifth, "extensive
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and the comparison of total values for all jobs. °00 The compensable
factors that are frequently used in job evaluations are reflected in the
language of the Equal Pay Act;' 0 ' they include the amounts of skill,
responsibility, and physical and mental effort requisite to job per-
formance, and the quality of the work environment. 02 The total
values quantify the worth of each job to the employer.
Job values are converted into wage rates by constructing a curve
that specifies an ideal relationship between scores and wages.' 03 Job
evaluation data may be translated directly into compensation levels
or utilized in combination with information on prevailing market
rates or union demands.10 4 Area wage rate surveys are often em-
ployed to anchor the wage curve to the relevant labor market. 10 5
Job evaluation techniques have been assailed by some advocates of
pay equity because these techniques, like the employment and place-
ment tests that are a continuing focus of Title VII litigation, 00 can
be used to justify unfair compensation practices. 0 7 Yet such techniques
technical knowledge gained through formal training." Each step on the scale would cor-
respond to a different point award for skill. R. SiBSON, supra note 5, at 41; cf. D.
BELCHER, supra note 93, at 176-78 (showing representative scales for other compensable
factors).
100. Factors may be weighted for comparison in terms of dollars rather than points.
According to this method, certain jobs are selected as benchmark jobs, and their wage
rates are accepted as appropriate. The evaluator then decides what proportion or amount
of the total wage for each benchmark job is attributable to each factor. Each factor for
every other job is assigned a value in comparison to the benchmark job. The appropriate
wage for each job is arrived at by summing the dollar values assigned to each job factor.
See D. BELCHER, supra note 93, at 157-69; D. TREIMAN, supra note 51, at 3-4.
101. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 201 (1974) (Congress deliberately
incorporated job evaluation terminology into Equal Pay Act).
102. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976); cf. D. TREIMIAN, supra note 51, at 6-7 (skill, effort, re-
sponsibility, and work environment are universal factors).
103. See D. TREIMAN, supra note 51, at 4, 50 n.2 (scores may be converted into wages
using straight-line wage curve or methods as sophisticated as linear regression analysis).
104. See D. BELCHER, supra note 93, at 254-55 (current wage rates, union demands,
market rates, and cost consequences of jobs may be considered); D. TREIMIAN, supra note
51, at 2 (area wage rates, company policy decisions, union demands, and traditional rates
among possible considerations).
105. See D. BELCHER, supra note 93, at 458-59; R. SIBsoN, supra note 5, at 56-59.
106. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975) (ability tests
used for job placement); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-36 (1971) (personnel
tests and high school diploma requirement for job placement).
107. See, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 90, at 434-43 (discussing discriminatory aspccts
of wage-setting procedures); Kronstadt, Job Valuation-Bias for Hire, 1979 NATION 777, 778-
79 (criticizing subjectivity of evaluation process). A recent National Academy of Sciences
report on the utility of job evaluation systems in resolving claims of pay discrimination
concluded that the systems have three important limitations:
1. the choice of factors and factor weights can have strong effects on the relative
ranking of jobs;
2. evaluations ultimately rest on subjective judgments (although systems differ in
the degree of subjectivity involved); and
3. the use of different job evaluation plans for different segments of an olganiza-
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may also be used to attack pay discrimination and should not be dis-
missed simply because they may be susceptible to abuse. The job
evaluation study is the best available method of identifying jobs that
are comparable though not equal.
B. Implementation of the Comparable Work Standard
The proposed equal pay-comparable work standard would be ap-
plied according to the general standards developed in Title VII de-
cisional law. To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff would need
to show that her job is comparable 0 to a job held predominantly
by men'00 and that there is a disparity between the wage rate for her
job and for the comparable male job. She must demonstrate that
the pay disparity adversely affects women employees as a group, 10
or that women are deliberately paid lower wages than men.'" Com-
parable work claims will frequently be raised in conjunction with
tion's work force precludes comparisons of the relationship of pay to job worth
across sectors.
D. TREIMrAN, supra note 51, at 30.
Proponents of equal pay for comparable work who reject job evaluation methodology
have not proposed an alternative method for comparing dissimilar jobs. See Blumrosen,
supra note 90, at 493-95 (proposing use of "reformed" job evaluation procedures to remedy
pay discrimination); Comment, Equal Pay for Comparable Work, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 475, 495 (1980) (suggesting no method for identifying jobs requiring "similar de-
grees of training, experience and responsibility").
108. Plaintiffs must establish that male and female jobs are comparable in order to
raise an inference of discrimination. But see Comment, supra note 107, at 494 (proposing
that statistics showing disparate impact of compensation practices should be sufficient
to establish prima facie Title VII violation). To demonstrate that the work of men in
the comparison job is comparable to her own, the plaintiff should be required to show
that the job evaluation scores of men's and women's jobs are approximately the same.
Several considerations favor proof of equality by a range of scores. First, job evaluation
systems are not so precise that defendants should be allowed to avoid liability because
job scores differ by one or two points. Second, in practice, employers generally assign
the same wage to broad classes or grades of jobs. See D. BELCHER, supra note 93, at 257-
59; R. SIBSoN, supra note 5, at 45-46. Plaintiffs should not be held to a more exacting
standard. Ideally, the EEOC would establish standards for job comparability demanding
equal pay.
109. A job may be considered a "sex-segregated" women's job for the purposes of Title
VII litigation even if a significant minority of the jobholders are male. See, e.g., D.
TREImAN, supra note 51, at 27 (Washington State comparable worth study defined sex-
stgregated jobs as jobs in which at least 70% of incumbents were of same sex); Blum-
rosen, supra note 90, at 461 (Women's Bureau of Federal Department of Labor uses 70%
figure).
110. This showing would be accomplished with statistics demonstrating a disparity
between the average earnings of men and women in comparable jobs. A disparity of any
size would support the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff could employ regression analysis to
demonstrate that the pay disparity is not related to nondiscriminatory factors. See Fisher,
Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 CoLuss. L. REv. 702, 721-25 (1980) (dis-
cussing use of regression analysis in wage discrimination litigation).
111. See note 74 supra (discussing disparate treatment theory).
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allegations that the employer has violated other provisions of Title
VII.112 Evidence that her employer's hiring or placement practices
are illegal might also support the plaintiff's argument that the
payment of unequal wages for comparable work is explained by
discrimination.1 "
The job comparison leading to a finding of pay discrimination in
segregated occupations could be accomplished during pretrial pro-
ceedings in one of several ways. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, or a similar state or local agency," 4 could conduct a
job study in the course of its complaint investigation.Y Private plain-
tiffs could employ experts to evaluate the work of men and women
and to prepare job evaluations for presentation to the court.", Data
from an employer's own job evaluations should also support a com-
parable work claim if jobs with equal scores pay unequal wages."17
Once the plaintiff has established her prima facie case, the em-
ployer would be required to offer a nondiscriminatory explanation
for the unequal rates of compensation in order to avoid liability. The
Bennett Amendment allows an employer to rebut the prima facie
case by showing that wage differentials are based on a seniority, merit,
or incentive system, or on some other factor not related to sex."-
112. See, e.g., Greenspan v. Automobile Club, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 184, 186 (E.D.
Mich. 1980) (combined challenge to hiring, promotion, compensation, and other prac-
tices); Kohne v. Imco Container Co., 480 F. Supp. 1015, 1016 (W.D. Va. 1979) (combined
challenge to compensation, assignment, disciplinary practices, and other conditions of
employment).
113. Evidence concerning hiring and placement practices would be relevant in a com-
parable work action because job segregation and pay discrimination are interrelated. See
pp. 662-64 supra.
114. See note 9 supra (discussing when charges must be filed with state or local agency).
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976) (EEOC authorized to investigate charges to de-
termine whether reasonable cause exists to pursue legal action); cf. Marshall v. J.C.
Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. 1166, 1190-91 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (job evaluation evidence
presented by Secretary of Labor in Equal Pay Act case); EEOC v. Sheet Metal Workers
Local 122, 463 F. Supp. 388, 402-03 (D. Md. 1978) (EEOC used expert witness to analyze
job qualifications).
116. See, e.g., Kohne v. Imco Container Co., 480 F. Supp. 1015, 1030, 1038-39 (W.D.
Va. 1979); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397, 402-05 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
117. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment re: Compensation Claims at 79-80, National Organization for Women v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., Civ. No. 4-74-555 (D. Minn., filed Aug. 4, 1980) (exhibit C) (employer
allegedly used separate wage curve to establish lower pay for women's jobs than for
men's jobs with equal job evaluation scores). But see Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353,
354 (8th Cir. 1977) (showing that employer paid unequal wages for clerical and physical
plant jobs with same job evaluation scores did not establish Title VII prima facie case).
118. See pp. 667-69 supra (Bennett Amendment permits Equal Pay Act defenses to be
raised in Title VII actions). The excepted merit, seniority, and incentive systems need
not be in written form, but must be standardized so that the same criteria are applied
to all employees. In addition, the basic elements of the system must have been communi-
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Under Title VII, wage-setting procedures that have a disparate im-
pact on men and women in comparable jobs could be justified by
a showing of business necessity.119 If the plaintiff proceeds on a dis-
parate treatment theory, the defendant must prove a nondiscrimina-
tory explanation for the different wages. 1 20 The willingness of women
to accept a lower wage than men, however, would not be a defense. 21
In deciding comparable work claims, courts would be required to
weigh expert testimony and assess job evaluation and other statistical
evidence. 22 Complexity is characteristic of much Title VII litigation,
cated to the employees. E.g., EEOC v. Aetna Ins. Co., 616 F.2d 719, 725 (4th Cir. 1980);
Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1974).
The courts have given considerable attention to the phrase "any other factor than
sex." Some employers have argued that participation in training programs is a factor
that should justify wage disparities. Training programs are evaluated like merit, seniority,
and incentive systems: the program must be formal in some sense and employees must be
aware of its existence. E.g., Marshall v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 572 F.2d 276, 279
(10th Cir. 1978); Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648, 655-57 (5th Cir. 1969).
Training programs that do not include women "carry a stigma of suspect validity" under
the Equal Pay Act, Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1048 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973), and may be illegal under Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(d) (1976) (prohibiting discrimination in training and apprenticeship programs).
The Third Circuit has held that the different average profitability of work performed
by men and women may also justify pay disparities. See Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes,
Inc., 473 F.2d 589, 597 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973) (higher gross profits of
men's clothing department, in which all salespersons were male, than of women's clothing
department, in which all salespersons were female, justified higher wages for men). A
defense based on economic benefits to the employer, however, should be allowed only
when those benefits are related to individual job performance. See, e.g., Pearce v.
Wichita County, 590 F.2d 128, 134 (5th Cir. 1979) (higher collection rate of male credit
manager might explain raises during employment but could not justify different base
salaries of male and female credit managers); Comment, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 1033, 1042
(1974) (use of gross profits test in Robert Hall incorrect because profit differential may
be related to sex-based discrimination by employer or industry).
119. See note 73 supra (test of business necessity requires proof that practice having
disparate impact is job-related or essential to safe and efficient operation of business).
In comparable work actions, a business necessity defense might involve validation that
the criteria used by the employer to establish wage levels are job-related and not sex-biased.
See Thomsen, supra note 93, at 16 (validation eliminates bias in job evaluation factor
choice and factor weights).
120. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24 (1978) (defendant must
"articulate" nondiscriminatory explanation); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 577-78 (1978) (same). The plaintiff may attempt to show in rebuttal that the de-
fendant's explanation of its action is a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
121. See note 80 supra.
122. The complexity of job evaluation procedures requires that courts carefully scru-
tinize job evaluations prepared for use in litigation. Courts should require precise defi-
nitions of the compensable factors employed and give greater weight to evaluations pre-
pared by multiple evaluators. See D. TRUIMAN, supra note 51, at 43 (participation of
several persons improves reliability); cf. R. SlaSON, supra note 5, at 50 (evaluator's judg-
ments must be screened for personal bias or prejudice). The factors chosen should be
validated to overcome discriminatory effects. See Thomsen, supra note 93, at 16. EEOC
Guidelines for conducting job evaluations would assist the courts in assessing job evalua-
tion results.
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and the courts should not be deterred from hearing comparable work
claims by concerns about manageability. In exceptionally difficult
cases, the supervision of job studies by a special master may be ap-
propriate. 2 3 Finally, the wage rate established by the employer for
the comparable male job should be used as the standard for adjusting
depressed wages paid to women. 24
Conclusion
Many women relegated to low-paying jobs are unable to obtain
relief from discriminatory wages because the courts have given a nar-
row reading to Title VII's prohibition of discrimination in compen-
sation. That interpretation is not justified in view of the Act's broad
remedial purposes. Title VII can and should be used to attack wage
differentials even when men and women are not performing sub-
stantially equal work.
The proposed comparable work standard is only a partial solution
to the problem of pay discrimination and occupational segregation.
Discriminatory earnings differentials can be fully eliminated only
through full occupational integration. At present, however, integration
is a distant goal. The equal pay for comparable work standard would
provide relief for present victims of discriminatory pay practices.
123. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the appointment of a special master
in cases that are especially burdensome or require unique expertise. FED. R. Civ. P.
53(b); see Note, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062, 1068 (1979).
Masters have been appointed frequently in Title VII cases to assist in the determination
of relief. See, e.g., Thompson v. Boyle, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. 15,906, 15,914 (D.D.C. 1980);
Kohne v. Imco Container Co., 480 F. Supp. 1015, 1039 (W.D. Va. 1979). In other cases,
masters have supervised discovery and assisted the court in making factual determinations.
See, e.g., Zegers v. Zegers, Inc., 458 F.2d 726, 727 (7th Cir. 1972); First-Iowa Hydro Elec.
Coop. v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 613, 618 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 871 (1957).
124. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221, 226-27 (7th Cir. 1972)
(employer may not reduce wage rate of any employee to comply with Equal Pay Act);
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 509-10 (E.D. Va. 1968) (wage rate for
black jobs raised to rate for comparable white jobs).
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